Following the seminal work of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) innovation is traditionally viewed as an individual process involving isolated agents connected only through market interactions and the outcome of this process, knowledge, is assumed to share the properties of a public good. Once produced, knowledge is supposed to spill over, i.e. to benefit other agents in the economy instantly. Departing from this approach we adopt here the view that innovation is a collective and interactive process and that knowledge is a collective good, in the sense that it flows only within networks or clubs. This shift of vision helps to improve our understanding of several points dealing with the innovation process. In this paper we explore three of these points: The absorption of external knowledge, firms' strategies of knowledge management (secrecy versus disclosure) and innovation public policies.
I. Introduction
In this paper we investigate some of the consequences triggered by a shift from a classical approach of innovation and knowledge towards an approach that puts more emphasis on non-market interactions, collaborations and on the genuine properties of knowledge. Specifically, we explore how this shift affects firms' absorption of external knowledge, firms' strategies of knowledge management (secrecy versus disclosure) and innovation public policies.
Traditionally, economic theory considers the problem of knowledge production and circulation through the lens of the classical theory of public goods. Following the seminal work of Arrow (1962) * BETA, Université Louis Pasteur, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67085 Strasbourg Cedex and Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, case postale 8888, Succursale Centre Ville, Montréal, Québec, Canada, H3C 3P8. e-mail : penin@cournot.u-strasbg.fr I wish to thank Patrick Cohendet, Pierre Mohnen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
-1 - and Nelson (1959) the innovation process is assumed to be an individual process that involves isolated agents connected only through market interactions and the outcome of this process, new knowledge, is assumed to share the two properties that characterize a public good; non-rivalry and nonappropriability. Non-rivalry means that it is socially undesirable to exclude someone from enjoying the benefits of knowledge (because there are no marginal cost to sharing these benefits), while nonappropriability implies that no one can be excluded.
Actually, some forms of knowledge can to some extent be appropriated and therefore knowledge is often considered as an impure public good. Furthermore, it is often unclear whether knowledge should be considered as a local or as a global public good 1 . However, either pure or impure, local or global, within the classical approach knowledge is perceived by economists of innovation as a public good. Like military dissuasion provided by the possession of nuclear weapons or security granted by the police, new knowledge is supposed to benefit other agents instantly.
This traditional vision of knowledge and innovation considers that once a firm invests in knowledge production, part of the new knowledge spills over automatically and feeds a common stock of knowledge or even, if knowledge is a global public good, a "world stock of knowledge" (Cowan, David et Foray, 2000) , which is composed of spillovers emitted by all the firms in the economy. In return, this stock of knowledge affects positively those firms, who can draw from it and hence who can increase their own stock of knowledge. This theoretical approach can be found, for instance, in many endogenous growth models in which a global stock of knowledge is usually included in firms' production function (Romer, 1986 ). Yet, this vision calls for two important remarks:
First, knowledge is assumed in some sense to flow 'in the air' 2 . Once produced, it is supposed to become instantly available to other firms. This means that vectors through which knowledge is conveyed are completely neglected. No explicit non-market interactions are considered: Knowledge transfers occur either through the market or are reduced to spillovers.
Second, in line with the traditional economic theory of externalities, knowledge transfers between firms are seen as completely exogenous. Firms are supposed to be passive in front of 1 In the former case only neighbours in the geographic space profit from the knowledge while in the latter case all the agents in the economy benefit from this knowledge. Empirical studies tend to confirm the assumption of knowledge as a local public good (Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg, 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996) . Yet, Stiglitz in his famous 1999 paper "knowledge as a global public good" claimed that knowledge must be thought of as a global public good because: "a mathematical theorem is as true in Russia as it is in the United States, in Africa as it is in Australia […] scientific truths are universal in nature".
2 Alfred Marshall in the eighth edition of its Principles of Economics (1920) described the mechanisms of knowledge spillovers by arguing that: "The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, and children learn many of them unconsciously. Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas" (p. 225, it. are mine).
-2 -knowledge spillovers, which occur as a 'deus ex machina', meaning that they fall from the sky. The sender cannot try to limit knowledge leakage and recipients do not have to feed an absorption capacity in order to absorb external knowledge. Furthermore, this view of knowledge leads to considering the transfer of knowledge between agents as undesired for firms who initially held the knowledge.
This vision of innovation and knowledge was finally perceived as hiding "a naïve portrait of the channels along which knowledge flow" (Breschi and Lissoni, 2003, p. 6 ) and gave place recently to a more competence based approach, which puts more weight on learning, competences and on the structures of interactions between agents (Le Bas, 1999) . We consider in this paper, in line with most of the recent studies in the field, that knowledge is a collective good or a club good. Once produced, knowledge does not flow 'in the air' and is not instantly available to other firms. Rather, knowledge is flowing within networks or clubs, it is transferred through complex interactions between the members of the club and it is available only to these members.
Moreover, not only knowledge is considered as a collective good but also the production of knowledge is viewed as a collective process. In order to be innovative, economic agents must cooperate, must set up formal research joint ventures or more informal innovation networks, in which they have the possibility to exchange some of their knowledge and to share specific competences (Gibbons, 1994; Cooke, 2001 ).
This shift of vision regarding the innovation process, which is exposed in part II, allows improving greatly our understanding of several elements dealing with innovation and knowledge. In this paper we explore the changes it brings regarding three points:
(i) Regarding strategies to absorb external knowledge. According to the traditional view, the absorption of external knowledge depends only on the absorption capacity of the recipient, which in turn is a function of his own internal R&D investments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) . But this resumes only half of the problem: To think of knowledge as a collective good and innovation as a collective process also points out the importance of collaborations, of connections to relevant sources of knowledge in order to absorb external knowledge (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Lim, 2000) . This point is developed in part III.
(ii) Regarding firms' strategies of secrecy versus disclosure. Many authors emphasised the fact that firms often freely and voluntarily reveal knowledge, which then becomes available to other firms (Allen, 1983; von Hippel, 1987) . A vision in terms of public good, which considers knowledge leakages as automatic and harmful, cannot explain these behaviours. Our claim is that to think of the innovation process as a collective process and knowledge as a collective good makes it possible to
give an explanation to behaviours of open knowledge disclosure (Hicks, 1995; Pénin, 2003a) . This point is discussed in part IV.
(iii) Regarding innovation public policies. Innovation policies based on the traditional vision of knowledge only focus on the appropriation failure inherent to the knowledge production process, neglecting the problems of coordination between agents. The introduction of a vision that stresses the -3 -importance of collaborations and knowledge exchanges leads to give more emphasis on coordination problems within the innovation process and hence leads to rethinking innovation policies. This point is developed in part V.
II. Rethinking the traditional hypotheses of the innovation process
Innovation is a group of activities involving interactions and knowledge exchanges between people and organizations. It is the result of inter-personal and inter-organization collaborations, which take place continuously and everywhere. In other words, innovation is a collective process. Economic agents involved in the innovation process are far from being isolated individuals connected with other individuals only through market interactions. Rather, they cooperate, they set up formal research joint ventures (RSV) or more informal innovation networks in which they exchange information and share specific competences.
Firms involved in the knowledge production process are members of innovation networks in the sense that they develop a reasonably stable set of partners with whom they collaborate 3 . An innovation network can be defined as: "A set of reciprocal, reputational or customary trust and cooperation based linkages among actors that coalesces to enable its members to pursue common interests, in this case on respect of innovation" (Cooke, 2001, p. 953) . Actors involved in this networking process are private firms (competitors, suppliers, customers), private go-between actors (such as venture capital firms, banks, consulting firms, etc.) and public institutions (such as university labs, institutions that aim at promoting innovations, patent offices, research institutes).
Furthermore, these links and connections, which firms involved in innovative activities develop with other firms and public institutions, go most of the time beyond the anonymous and hostile market relationship (Guellec, 1999, p. 53) . Bach and Lhuillery (1999, p. 350 ) illustrate this point (that agents develop non-market interactions) by making a clear reference to the work of Coase (1960) . They explain that the economy of R&D followed the evolution of the theory of the firm and the evolution of the classical theory of externalities by embarking into a 'coasian slide'. In other words, firms do not face an infinity of anonymous agents, do not face the market, as it is assumed by the traditional theory of externalities, but they face a web of well identified firms, they evolve in a world of market and non-market interactions among known and unknown agents, a world composed of many 'small worlds' or networks (Granovetter, 1973; .
To put it plainly, knowledge production is a matter of formal and informal collaborations and of non-market interactions. good but is rather a sticky good that remains within the group that has produced it, i.e. firms who want to absorb it must first enter the club in which this knowledge resides.
Knowledge cannot be considered as a public good because, once produced, it does not become automatically and instantly available to other agents. It can be appropriated during very long spell of time and even when it leaks it becomes available only to agents who developed some links with its source. As Gibbons (1994) puts it, in a collective form of knowledge production, knowledge production and knowledge appropriation are likely to converge. Johnson and Lundvall (2001, p. 12) also stress that: "Reality is complex and most knowledge is neither completely public nor completely private. The knowledge base is fragmented and constituted by semi-public "pools" to which access is shared regionally, professionally and through networking". To assume that knowledge, once produced, becomes instantly available to other agents is equivalent to expressing an absolute lack of understanding about how knowledge is transferred among individuals and organisations. Knowledge 4 Examples of such formal and informal collaborations are many. The interested reader may consult Hagedoorn (1995) , for instance, who made an in depth analysis of the links and R&D partnerships that were developed among firms in the automotive, aviation/defence, chemical and heavy electrical instruments industries. Industrial clusters such as the Silicon Valley in California, Route 128 near Boston (Saxenian, 1994) or NorCOM in Northern Denmark (Dahl and Pedersen, 2003) are also prominent examples of collective forms of innovation and illustrate, among others, the importance of spatial proximity.
-5 -does not flow 'in the air' but is embodied in physical, material supports whose movements are limited by material contingencies.
For instance, knowledge often takes a tacit form and as such is hardly transferable without physical contacts 5 . Since tacit knowledge is embodied in the individual or group who masters it, only people who develop privileged contacts with the owner of a given piece of tacit knowledge may have a chance of accessing this knowledge. When knowledge is embodied in the mind of a researcher, only colleagues who have personal contacts with him have the opportunity to learn this knowledge.
Yet, even codified knowledge that has been released in books or patents must be considered as something different than a pure public good 6 . Indeed, when it is released, knowledge is still embodied into a material support, either a patent, or a book, or an industrial artefact. Hence, the circulation of a given piece of codified knowledge is always limited by its support and a firm cannot benefit from this knowledge without having a connection (even a very weak one) with the source (Callon, 1999) . For instance, if knowledge is released via a note internal to a given organisation then only the members of this organisation and their relatives, and the relatives of their relatives, may be given a chance to access this information. If knowledge is released into a scientific journal, only agents who read this journal or who know someone who reads it, etc., may be given a chance to access this information.
Once produced and released knowledge is therefore far from being automatically and instantly available to all the agents that compose the economy.
We will thus refer to knowledge as a club good or a collective good in the sense that knowledge does not flow 'in the air' but is embodied within a given set of agents, a club or a network.
New knowledge does not spill over from its innovator to full a public pool of knowledge. It flows only through networking and it is available only to firms who developed links with its owner. There does not exist something like a world stock of knowledge, which all the individuals can automatically use depending on their absorption capacity. Rather, knowledge is accessible only to some specific agents who know where to look for it and who are allowed to access it. R&D consortia are perfect examples of clubs in which knowledge flows are limited to members 7 .
It must be noted that this concept of knowledge as a collective good may replace advantageously the concept of knowledge as a local public good, which is usually central to every discussion dealing with the geography of innovation. Indeed, many empirical studies emphasised that knowledge circulation is often limited geographically (Jaffe et al., 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Aharonson, Baum and Feldman, 2004) . But this finding does not mean that knowledge is a local public good. The spatial limitation of knowledge flows can easily be explained by considering that knowledge is a collective good and that the club in which it is flowing admits a spatial dimension (social proximity is often facilitated by spatial proximity because it is obvious that contacts are easier to make with neighbours than with people living ten thousands kilometres away). We indeed argue in this paper that it is social proximity and not spatial proximity that influences knowledge flows (Amin and Cohendet, 2004) . This point was underlined by , who found out that spatial effects vanish when knowledge flows are controlled for any network relationship, suggesting that if knowledge transfers appear to be sometimes limited in space it is only because the club in which knowledge is flowing is geographically limited 8 .
To sum up, innovation is a collective process that involves heterogeneous agents who develop links that go beyond market relationships and the outcome of this process, new knowledge, is a collective good. It is doubtless that this shift of vision regarding the properties of the innovation process has many consequences on our understanding of the specific mechanisms that compose this process. Let us now examine three of these changes.
III. The absorption of external knowledge as a function of firms' connectedness
A direct corollary of this vision of the innovation process in terms of collaboration and collective good is that it is important for firms who want to absorb external knowledge to be actively involved in R&D collaborations with other organizations. To neglect this connectedness aspect may have huge negative consequences on firms' knowledge stock, which in turn may affect their innovativeness and hence their overall profitability.
example is given by the "Centre d'étude du polymorphisme humain (CEPH)", a French private research foundation which, according to Cassier (2002, p. 104-105) , invented in the beginning of the eighties an original system of collective research in order to build the map of the human genome. The CEPH network established a policy of diffusion of its results in two concentric circles: First, results of its research are gathered into a private database, which is available only to the members of the network. Then after two years, they become available to the entire scientific community as they are put into a public database. 8 In other words, when we say that knowledge flows are limited by spatial proximity we are not wrong but we miss an important step. We forget to mention that it is social proximity that really matters and if spatial proximity seems to matter it is only because it influences social proximity.
-7 -
To illustrate the importance of R&D collaborations in order to absorb knowledge, let us start by a short story drawn from Lim (2000) . Lim studied the case of copper interconnect technology for semiconductors, which was developed by IBM. Among the other firms who invested much less than IBM in this technology some were able to catch up and to adopt the technology while others were not.
The salient point here is that some firms performed little R&D and were able to catch up faster than other firms who performed far more R&D. Lim attributes this struggling pattern to what he refers as firms' connectedness. Firms who were able to catch up were better connected, developed a better network than those who failed. In other words, rapid adopters were able to adopt the technology by leveraging their connectedness to Sematech, universities and other firms that had access to copper technology, rather than by relying on their own R&D. Among other advantages, better-connected firms gained useful information and had the opportunity to hire competent researchers from universities and from the Sematech consortium. Lim formulates the following conclusion:
"A firm that does not perform R&D is not excluded from building absorptive capacity if alternatives are feasible. Such alternatives include funding research at universities, co-authoring with academics, joining R&D consortia, and forming alliances with other companies with access to technology. These activities permit a firm to remain in close connection with important external sources of technical knowledge." (Lim, 2000, p. 7) This example fits perfectly to the point we want to make here and which is summarized in figure 1 below: In order to absorb external knowledge it is not sufficient for firms to develop a strong absorption capacity, which is of no use if they have no available external knowledge to absorb. Firms must also develop their connectedness with potential sources of knowledge, must also collaborate with agents who hold valuable knowledge. Developing her absorption capacity instead of her connectedness leads to a situation in which a firm is able to absorb knowledge but does not have any external knowledge to absorb. Conversely, developing her connectedness and not her absorption capacity is equivalent to having a lot of potential knowledge to absorb but not the ability to absorb it.
In other words, a firm absorptive capacity depends both upon its internal R&D activity and its connectedness to external sources of relevant technical knowledge (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) .
The traditional view of knowledge, which assumed that knowledge is a public good, was doomed to neglect the importance of networking and connectedness in the absorption process. As soon as knowledge is considered as a public good, meaning that once produced it becomes available to everybody, there is no need to be connected with the source of knowledge in order to access it. The central point in order to absorb external knowledge is to enhance its ability to tap into the reservoir of external knowledge, which can be done by investing in the development of an absorption capacity. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) were the first to establish this conclusion. But it was also emphasised more recently by Stiglitz (1999) who, after having explained why knowledge should be considered as -8 -a global public good, advised policy makers in developed and developing countries to implement policies to increase their absorption capacity. Such policies include, for instance, investments in education and research.
However, to consider knowledge as a collective good leads to emphasise the key role of firms' degree of connectedness with other agents in order to absorb knowledge held by those agents. Indeed, within this perspective, once diffused, knowledge is not available to others instantly but flows within a precise set of well-defined agents, a club or a network. Hence, before having the opportunity to absorb knowledge, firms must first join the club in which it is flowing because, as Breschi and Lissoni (2003, p. 8) noticed: "spillovers from an active club member will reach distant fellow members with some delay or imprecision, and will possibly never reach outsiders". To put it plainly, developing a network of relationships is an essential feature for firms in order to absorb knowledge held by other organizations. For instance, collaborations with universities help to maintain contacts with teams of recognised scientific excellence, which in turn allows to keep in touch with developments in particular technological fields or to hire promising graduate students.
Similarly, informal contacts between employees are important because when a firm needs to solve a technical problem researchers are then able to gather information from personal contacts (Dahl and Pedersen, 2003) . Notice further that this focus on firms' connectedness helps to understand why firms sometimes pay huge amounts of money to hire famous academic researchers, whose function in the firm is often not to work to the resolution of technical problems. Rather, these star scientists ensure the reputation of the firm. As such, they facilitate cooperation with academic partners, with financial markets, with other firms, etc. In other words, they provide access to their networks, which in turn opens the door to valuable stock of external knowledge.
Connectedness is therefore a key asset for firms in order to access external sources of knowledge 9 . An important point for firms is thus to improve their connectedness, to increase their set of relationships. To do so, firms can undertake many strategies as it is illustrated in figure 1: They may perform their own R&D, which allows to develop links with other organizations via the reputation of innovator of the firm, they may fund research in universities, they may hire star scientists and graduate students, who will in the future keep in touch with their academic colleagues, etc.
Specifically, to openly disclose knowledge may be a way to develop contacts with potential partners. Gambardella (1992) , for instance, noticed that successful pharmaceutical firms are like academic departments in the sense that they implement a policy of open science by allowing their scientists to publish their work. This openness is viewed as a necessary condition to gain access to valuable sources of external knowledge by entering inner circle of scientific communities.
IV. Knowledge management: Secrecy versus open disclosure
The importance for firms to develop many connections with other organizations may hence provide an explanation to a quite puzzling feature of industrial economics, namely behaviours of open knowledge disclosure 10 . Defying conventional wisdom firms often disclose openly and freely valuable information to other firms, including to their competitors. They do so by letting their researchers publish in scientific journals, by encouraging them to present their research in conferences, by publishing information on their web sites or by applying for patents while they do not intend to use the exclusive property right associated with the patent (for empirical evidence of behaviours of open knowledge disclosure see Allen, 1983; Hicks, Ishizuka, Keen and Sweet, 1994; Hick, 1995) . 9 The network is one of firms' most important assets (Kogut, 2000) . To illustrate this point, let us relate a simple anecdote:
Recently several well-known French politicians faced in court the accusation for having used their influence over local firms to force them to employ persons of their neighbourhood fictively, meaning that firms were paying friends of politicians for a work that was not effective. For instance, a firm paid 200,000 euros to a woman supposed to work for her, whereas this woman never came in the company, had no office, no professional car, etc. The firm CEO defended this situation by arguing that his firm benefited from the address-book of the person employed and that this address-book was easily worth 200,000 euros. 10 We use the terminology open knowledge disclosure by opposition with a closed or restrained knowledge disclosure. When knowledge is openly disclosed it means that nobody can prevent a given firm from accessing the disclosed knowledge (for instance, disclosure via books, the Internet or journals). Conversely, when knowledge disclosure is closed, it means that the sender can thoroughly select the recipients and hence can control to some extent the beneficiaries of the disclosed knowledge.
-10 -On the one hand, those behaviours of open knowledge disclosure are costly. The most dissuasive cost probably stems from the communication of useful information to potential competitors, which may sharply affect disclosing firms' profitability through the effect of competition. Indeed, the disclosed knowledge is often valuable for other firms 11 . Rival firms can absorb and use it, thus improving their technology and competing more fiercely with disclosing firms. This sole cost may frequently deter firms from openly disclosing knowledge. Other costs involve the codification of the disclosed knowledge (which must be articulated and expressed into a language) or the fact that the support through which the diffusion is operated may not be free (patent application for instance is expensive).
On the other hand, open knowledge disclosure means to offer valuable knowledge to other firms without being ensured of any direct remuneration. Since, open knowledge disclosure is not directly remunerated, it is unclear how these behaviours can be profitable from an economic point of view. They can, at first sight, only turn to be harmful to the sender. These two features, high costs and uncertain benefits, explain why behaviours of open knowledge disclosure were for long misunderstood by industrial economists, who could not figure out why rational, profit seeking firms provide their competitors with useful information for free.
However, nowadays economic reasons that may encourage firms to openly disclose knowledge are well accounted for by standard economic theory (Pénin, 2003a) . For instance, it was suggested that firms may be induced to reveal widely some of their knowledge in order to trigger network effects (Boivin, 2000) , to benefit from improvements developed by users or suppliers (Harhoff, 1996; Harhoff et al., 2003) , to trigger reciprocity effects (von Hippel, 1987; Eaton and Eswaran, 2001) , to shorten patent races (De Fraja, 1993) , to develop a reputation as innovator, etc.
Here, we insist on the fact that to view knowledge as a collective good and the innovation process as a collective process may provide an additional explanation to behaviours of knowledge disclosure.
Indeed, we emphasised throughout this work that the production of new knowledge is a collective process that involves complex interactions among specialised agents who must cooperate.
Specifically, we stressed that developing R&D collaborations is essential for firms who intend to be innovative because it allows benefiting of the knowledge held by other firms or by public institutions.
Yet, a central question that firms involved in the collective process of innovation have to address is finding the most appropriate partners. Indeed, R&D collaborations are costly and risky strategies. For a firm they often mean to give access to her most precious knowledge to her collaborators, who may often be rivals too. R&D collaborations also require sometimes investing in the construction of common, specific assets, exposing firms to a loss of freedom in their strategic 11 It has been shown that scientific publications by firms are not less cited than those by universities, suggesting that they must contain useful information (Cockburn and Henderson, 1994; Hicks et al., 1994; Hicks, 1995) . Similarly, patents have to be checked by an examiner before being granted, meaning that patents must somehow convey useful information.
-11 -choices. Furthermore, firms have the capacity to manage only a finite number of collaborations. They cannot collaborate with everybody. Finally, even in cases these considerations about costs of the collaboration can be set aside, it remains that firms are clearly more interested in collaborating with other firms or public institutions who are at the forefront of the technological frontier. All these elements tend to support the view that firms must thoroughly select their partners.
However, the innovation process takes place in an environment of incomplete information and this feature may constitute an insurmountable obstacle for firms willing to cooperate. Indeed, firms usually do not know the exact characteristics and, more specifically, the competences of other firms.
Hence, how can they identify potential fruitful partnerships? How (based on which criteria) can they distinguish between profitable collaborations and less profitable ones? In other words, firms who wish to develop R&D partnerships with other firms or with public institutions face adverse selection problems (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973) , and these problems can provide an explanation to behaviours of open knowledge disclosure.
Indeed, open knowledge disclosure may be an efficient strategy to break the adverse selection problems that impede the formation of R&D collaborations. In some sense, firms who openly disclose knowledge signal their competences to other firms. Therefore, by disclosing widely some knowledge, competent firms may expect to signal that they are competent to industrial and academic communities, 12 It is worth noticing that an analogy can be drawn between behaviours of open knowledge disclosure and firms decision of geographic location. Like the decision to openly disclose knowledge, the choice of geographic location may be to some extent driven by the willingness to join an industrial cluster in order to gain an access to the knowledge that flows within this cluster (Long and Soubeyran, 1998) . As Aharonson, Baum and Feldman (2004, p. 20) put it: "location and the formation of alliances may be best considered as strategic decisions that provide a means for firms to succeed at innovation".
-12 - Cockburn and Henderson (1998) also pointed out that it is not sufficient for researchers to read scientific journals or to attend conferences in order to establish links with external sources of knowledge. Firms must also be active participants in the construction of publicly available knowledge and hence must encourage their researchers to publish and to present their research in conferences.
Among others, they remarked that to allow researchers to publish is a way to force them to remain in close touch with the state of the knowledge in their field, thus enabling the firm to be aware of the latest developments.
Finally, the role of open knowledge disclosure in the collaboration process was also emphasised by Grossetti and Bès (2002) To summarize, as soon as we take for granted that innovation requires the collaboration of several actors and that this process of collaboration takes place within an environment of incomplete information (agents do not know with which partners it would be preferable to cooperate), one may suggest the following proposition: Firms are induced to openly disclose knowledge in order to signal their competences to scientific and industrial communities, thus facilitating the search for R&D partnerships. By viewing innovation as a collective process it is therefore possible to give a new explanation to behaviours of open knowledge disclosure.
V. Innovation policies: Less appropriation concerns and more focus on coordination
A third point that cannot be comprehended by the traditional vision of innovation is the need to implement public policies aiming at ensuring the coordination among agents who are part of the innovation process. Indeed, within the traditional framework there cannot be any diffusion and coordination problems since it is assumed that knowledge circulates perfectly; that once produced it flows freely to everybody. As a matter of fact then, the main purpose for policy makers is to increase incentives to innovate (incentives that are assumed to be sharply reduced by the presence of spillovers)
even if the price to pay is a decreased diffusion of the produced knowledge. This traditional vision was at the source of most of the past innovation policies, which almost all focused on appropriation -13 -concerns while neglecting the coordination side. Everywhere governments implemented tax cuts for R&D investments and reinforced the system of intellectual protection rights but few actions were undertaken to facilitate cooperation between agents.
However, policies that focus mainly on appropriation concerns may be misleading. It was indeed argued in this paper that knowledge is not a public good; that it can often be appropriated at least in part; that when it is released it does not become available to everybody; and that even when it is available to other firms it benefits them only after they realize important investments to absorb this knowledge. The corollary of these observations is that the lack of incentives to invest in R&D is probably not as important as assumed by the traditional vision of knowledge. This statement is further strengthened by the fact that firms have many incentives to invest in knowledge production even under a weak appropriation regime:
(i) For instance, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) showed that even with strong spillovers firms may have incentives to invest in R&D in order to build an absorption capacity and to be able to absorb knowledge that spilled over; Contrary to what is traditionally assumed, in such a case, spillovers may therefore encourage R&D investments; (ii) Firms' investments in R&D may also be triggered by the willingness to remain on the technological frontier of the industry. To perform R&D may be a survival necessity in a world in which competition is a matter of innovation. When a firm stops being innovative she is certain to be kicked out of the market within a more or less short spell of time; (iii)
Firms who perform R&D may be willing to acquire a reputation as innovators, which may lead to profitability even if the firm does not capture the full benefit of its R&D; (iv) Finally, a last reason that explains why innovations may frequently emerge on the market even without a strong appropriation regime, is the consideration of the creative pleasure, the man's desire to understand. Nowadays, there still remain cases where individual inventors create innovations, although such cases are no longer very common. These individual inventors probably welcome being rewarded for their innovation but certainly do not live in the expectation of such a reward and therefore the absence of monetary incentives does not affect their incentives to invent.
The arguments discussed so far suggest therefore that the deficit of incentives to invest in knowledge production was probably over estimated by the traditional framework, which led to exaggerate widely the appropriation concerns. On the other side, the need to achieve coordination between agents involved in the knowledge production process and the need to allow a wide circulation of the produced knowledge were surprisingly neglected. Yet, these coordination problems are likely to be as damaging, if not more damaging than appropriation problems (Pénin, 2003b) .
Indeed, knowledge production is a collective, multi-disciplinary and cumulative process. This collective process may be impeded by strong coordination problems that may complicate cooperation and knowledge circulation between agents. First, as mentioned earlier, the innovation process takes place in an environment of incomplete information, i.e. the presence of strong asymmetries of information regarding firms' competences may sharply decrease the volume of exchanges between -14 -firms. Adverse selection and moral hazards problems may decrease firms' willingness to cooperate because they fear to be betrayed.
Second, the circulation of knowledge is slowed down because firms do not have the same competences, the same language, and even when they do, the knowledge can just be tacit, meaning that it is very hard to transfer. These problems, mainly the existence of tacit knowledge and of asymmetries of information, may impede severely the collective and cumulative process of knowledge production.
This new vision of the knowledge production process strongly contrasts with the traditional view. Within a competence-based framework a policy oriented to solve only appropriation problems at the detriment of the coordination problems would be misleading. Even if firms can perfectly appropriate their knowledge (and hence if the incentives to invest in knowledge production are maximal) the innovation process may not perform well, since agents may have difficulties to achieve coordination. Providing incentives to innovators is often necessary but it is not enough because incentives are worth nothing if firms cannot find the external competences that would enable them to implement their innovations. Hence, one of the most important points underlined by this new approach
is that perhaps appropriation concerns should not be the only preoccupation of policy makers. Policies oriented to help coordination between knowledge producers and to facilitate the circulation of knowledge are also required.
This conclusion provides a direct rationale for policies aiming at promoting R&D collaborations at the regional, national and even international levels. With the purpose to encourage collaborations policy makers may provide facilities to connect the different actors such as firms, -15 -Policies must be implemented to ease coordination among actors of innovation. What is the impact of this finding on patent policy 14 ? We believe that patents are not only useful to provide incentives but can also help actors of innovation to achieve coordination. In theory patents have a double function, since they both protect an innovation and widely disclose the knowledge related to this innovation (the disclosure of the knowledge underlying a patent operates through the automatic publication of the description of the innovation by the national patent office). The combination of these two functions of protection and knowledge disclosure transforms a patent into a device that can help firms to achieve coordination.
First, patents provide a signal of where competences are located and hence they help agents from sometimes very different background to meet. Second, the property right associated with a patent may, paradoxically, often favour knowledge transfer. Indeed, property rights are central to set up a market for technologies (Arora and Fosfuri, 2000) and to frame the negotiations between firms.
Therefore, more than a simple guarantee of a monopoly position, in some industries patents can play a fundamental role of coordination in the innovation process, by easing the exchanges of knowledge and R&D collaborations (Levin, Nelson, Klevorick and Winter, 1987; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) . In order to improve this role of coordination of patents, governments may, for instance, improve their controls on patents' novelty and usefulness requirements (which would improve the signal sent by patents regarding the competences of their owners) and ensure strong property rights (which would increase the trust of innovators in the system and therefore encourage cross-licensing and R&D cooperation 15 ).
To summarize, following the vision of knowledge and of its production process that has been presented here, different innovation policies are needed. On the one hand, the traditional view puts all the weight on the lack of incentives and hence on the need to restore appropriation. On the other hand, the view in terms of collaborations and non-market interactions puts more weight on the necessity to ensure a wide circulation of knowledge and the coordination among agents.
14 An in depth discussion about patent policy, although essential, is beyond the objective of this paper. We just want to introduce the fact that patents are not only devices of exclusion, as it is usually put forward in economic textbooks, but can also be devices to ease coordination among actors of innovation. For in more depth discussions about patent policy, interested readers can consult Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998), Jaffe (2000) , Kingston (2001) or Pénin (2003b) . 15 Strong property rights increase the confidence of the agents and decrease the risks and uncertainties of trading knowledge.
Hence strong legal property rights can help to promote collective forms of knowledge production and governments have to ensure strong property rights in order to favour knowledge exchange. But this does not mean that they must tolerate and protect strong monopolies. Since strong property rights may also lead to situation where the pace of innovation is blocked, governments must be careful to avoid such situation to occur by encouraging collaborations and by making it clear that they will not tolerate that patent owners refuse to grant license when the offer is widely perceived as fair.
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VI.

Conclusion
Traditionally it has been an accepted view that innovation is a linear and individual process and that knowledge is a public good, i.e. once produced knowledge is supposed to be available to all the agents of the economy instantly. Our claim in this paper, in line with many recent works, is that both assumptions must be rejected and give place to an approach of innovation as a collective process and of knowledge as a collective good. New knowledge is the outcome of complex interactions between agents and it is available only to those who participate in its production or who have contacts with the owner.
This rethinking of the properties of the innovation process allows us to improve our understanding of this process regarding many points. For instance, it was shown here that it leads to: Specifically, it was argued that the absorption of external knowledge necessitates not only the construction of an absorption capacity but also to be part of innovation networks in which relevant knowledge is flowing. In turn, this need to be connected with external sources of knowledge may allow us to better-understand behaviours of open knowledge disclosure: Such behaviours can be a reaction of competent firms, who attempt to signal to other firms that they are competent in order to facilitate the formation of collaborations in R&D. Firms who reveal knowledge may wish to improve their reputation as innovator in order to find partners more easily. This necessity to signal competences is due to the presence of strong problems of incomplete information within the innovation process.
The presence of such informational problems also suggests that policy makers should pay some attention to the coordination failure that impede the innovation process rather than focusing only on the appropriation failure. Damages provoked by the latter were strongly overestimated by the traditional approach while those caused by the former were largely under estimated.
It is likely that those three points represent only a fraction of the changes triggered by the introduction of a new theoretical approach. Here are some tracks that may deserve to be analysed in more depth in future studies: For instance, to think in terms of club and network may bring tremendous changes regarding the question of what is a firm and what is exactly the frontier of the firm. It may also help to understand better how to assess the value of a firm, which cannot be reduced merely to the sum of its material assets. Immaterial assets, such as membership in valuable networks, must also be included in firms ' valuation (Kogut, 2000) .
Furthermore, this approach enables to make slightly different recommendations to policy makers in developing countries. Usually economic models conclude that an appropriate policy for developing countries to catch up with developed countries is more sparing, more education (in order to improve the absorption capacity of the country), and more financial and commercial openness (in -17 -order to benefit from spillovers, either pecuniary or pure, that are emitted by other countries). But viewing knowledge as a collective good implies that governments in developing countries should also orient their policies towards the implementation of connections between national universities, national firms and research institutions in other countries. Only such a networking strategy aimed at incorporating local actors in wider international systems of innovation, may enable developing countries to benefit from the knowledge developed in other countries and hence may give them a chance of catching up. It is worth noticing that international organisations may play a central role in fostering this international networking process.
Similarly, to consider knowledge as a collective good and not as a local public good may have several consequences on firms' strategies. For instance, as soon as knowledge is regarded as a local public good, firms have an incentive to cluster, to gather on the same territory. If knowledge circulation is limited to a given region, firms may find some incentives to agglomerate in this region in order to benefit from the knowledge that flows within it. This idea was formalised, among others, by Long and Soubeyran (1998) , who demonstrated how the fact that geographic proximity affects the circulation of knowledge may be a key element in the decision of firms to form industrial clusters, although this proximity also exacerbates competition between firms. In other words, according to this view all that is needed to access external knowledge is to set up a new factory in a given region where this knowledge is flowing, which is a rather passive vision of knowledge flow. But as soon as knowledge is viewed as a collective good, it may not work for firms willing to absorb knowledge to only set up a factory in a given territory. Firms must rather develop social links with other firms, they must enter clubs in which knowledge is flowing. Spatial proximity may facilitate the construction of social links but it is only one strategy among many. In order to be granted access to R&D collaborations firms must also set up other complementary strategies, such as open knowledge disclosure, for instance.
